Spring has just come to Japan, though there still is a trace of winter left in the air. I hope you all are doing well.
This year's annual meeting of the Japanese Society for Animal Psychology will be held at INUYAMA INTERNATIONAL SIGHTSEEING CENTER (FREUDE) in Inuyama-shi, Aichi. The meeting is three days long from Saturday, July 19 th to Monday, July 21st, 2014.
During the meeting, we will have a public symposium and two special symposiums. At a public symposium, five invited guest speakers from abroad will give a talk: Dr. Klaus Zuberbuehler (monkeys), Dr. Robert Hampton (monkeys), Dr. Vincent Janik (dolphins), Dr. Raman Sukumar (elephants), and Dr. John Iversen (birds). They will present the latest findings of their researches conducted on various animal species. At special symposiums, we invited Drs. Peggy Mason, Ayaka Takimoto, and Teresa Romero for the theme of “empathy" and Drs. Michael Beran, Josep Call, and Satoshi Umeda for the topics of “science of mental time". A variety of interesting presentations are expected in these symposiums. We also invited Drs. Ralph Adolphs, Elizabeth Brannon, Michael Platt, and Maciej Trojan, who are intensively studying in the fields related to Animal Psychology.
We would like to inform you that all presentation sessions (both orals and posters) during the 74th Annual Meeting will be carried out in English for the first time in the history of the Japanese Society for Animal Psychology. It's one of our attempts to promote internalization in preparation for organizing ICP2016 here in Japan. We appreciate your understanding and are looking forward to many of you attending the meeting and sharing your researches with us.
This meeting is organized by Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University, which is located on a hill, a 20-minute walk from the meeting site “FREUDE". There our chimpanzees live in an outdoor compound where they can see Inuyama Castle on their west, and the city of Inuyama below their eyes. Inuyama is a city of international tourism with the Japan Monkey Centre which is a home of 67 primate species as well as the National Treasure “Inuyama Castle", a site of traditional cormorant fishing called “Ukai" on the Kiso River, the Museum Meiji-mura, and the Little World. I hope you will enjoy the lush greenery of Inuyama this time of year before the blistering heat of summer sets in.
Please note that the deadline for application is about two months earlier than last year due to the schedule of this year's meeting.
We, the members of the organizing committee, sincerely hope that many of you will be able to attend and give a presentation at the 74th Annual Meeting.
今大会では、海外から4名の先生をお招きした公開シンポジウムと、二つの特別シンポジウムを企画しています。公開シンポジウムでは、Klaus Zuberbuehler先生（サル）、Robert Hampton先生（サル）、Vincent Janik先生（イルカ）、John Iversen先生（トリ）をお招きし、多様な生物種における最新の研究成果を発表していただきます。特別シンポジウムでは、「共感性」、「こころの時間学」をテーマとして、多くの興味深い発表が予定されております。
A potential function of metacognitive monitoring is to provide dynamic feedback on the status of ongoing cognitive processes to optimize cognitive control of those processes. Most of the work investigating metacognition in nonhumans has focused on the monitoring side of this interaction while minimizing the role that feedback based cognitive control might have on cognition. For example, metacognitive monitoring has been inferred when monkeys exert cognitive control in minimal ways, such as by avoiding tests or seeking information when ignorant. I will describe experiments from our lab in which we have begun to test whether metacognitive monitoring and control might interact in more dynamic ways in the contexts of working memory and discrimination.
The tendency to move in rhythmic synchrony with a musical beat is a human universal yet is not commonly observed in other species. In addition to its foundational role in music cognition, beat synchronization has been argued to play an important prosocial role in promoting interpersonal connections and possibly in diffusing group tensions. Synchronization to a beat involves multiple cognitive functions, including the ability to extract a simple periodicity from a complex musical stimulus and the ability to couple rhythmic movement to sound in a highly flexible manner. Does human ability in beat synchronization reflect a brain specialization for music cognition, for social bonding, or does it build on neural circuitry that ordinarily serves other functions? Several hypotheses have sought to explain the origins of human synchronization with music: The "vocal learning and rhythmic synchronization" hypothesis (Patel, 2006) posits that entrainment relies on the neural circuitry for complex vocal learning, which is posited to require tight coupling between auditory and motor systems. The "gradual audiomotor evolution" hypothesis (Merchant & Honing, 2014) proposes that component skills for beat synchronization are only partly shared with non-human primates. In this talk I will present experimental results bearing on this question, demonstrating rhythmic synchronization the sulphur-crested cockatoo (Cacatua galerita eleonora), which is able to synchronize with complex music across a range of tempos. Specifically, bouts of extended synchronized movement were observed, in the absence of any visual movement cues, and the rate of these movements varied with music tempo. This reveals both a perceptual ability to extract a simple periodicity from a complex musical signal, but also, crucially, the ability to couple movement timing to sound. As the sulphur-crested cockatoo is a vocal learner, this finding is consistent with he vocal learning hypothesis. We found additionally that the tendency to synchronize is greatly enhanced with human interaction, suggesting the joint importance of social factors. These results were the first indication that synchronization to a musical beat is not uniquely human and demonstrate how animal models can provide insights into the neurobiology and evolution of human music, sensorimotor integration, and social interaction.
Reference is a key component in the evolution of complex communication systems. Studies on animals have focussed on functionally referential signals, in which a call is reliably paired with a stimulus and this correlation is used by receivers to display behaviour appropriate to the communicated context. This approach does not make any inferences about the intention of the signaller. In its simplest form, reference does not require intention and occurs through a strong genetic predisposition in which the use of existing signals is restricted to exchanging information about a specific context. A good example here is the dance language of bees used to inform hive members of lucrative food locations. Studies on nonhuman primates have provided clear evidence for referential communication taking place intentionally. While nonhuman primates cannot invent or copy novel signals, they use different pre-existing signals to communicate about different food items, predators or social classes. In humans, reference goes beyond such constraints and novel signals can be introduced and used in referential communication. However, only few animals share the ability of referential communication and vocal learning with us. These are the cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) and the psittaciformes (parrots). In our work on bottlenose dolphins, we are studying the natural communication system of these animals to investigate how they use their ability of vocal labelling with learned signals in their own communication system. Bottlenose dolphins develop individually distinctive signature whistles that broadcast an animal’s identity by the unique frequency modulation pattern. We documented stages of signature whistle development for three calves showing the changes in preferred frequency modulation patterns over time. Individuals use these signals as their prime whistle emitted when in isolation but also occasionally copy signature whistles of close relatives or associates. When copying, they introduce modifications to the copied whistle, making them recognisable as copies. In isolation, these exchanges occur most often in vocal matching interactions between the signature whistle owner and the copier. However, in free swimming, wild dolphins, signature whistles of absent dolphins are heard regularly. We have shown that wild dolphins can be addressed with copies of their own whistle. We are now studying whether such copies of absent animals occur on patterns that suggest that the emitter is searching for the whistle owner, or whether they are more likely to be used to exchange information about third parties, which would be evidence for referential use of these learned signals.
In 1871 Darwin famously wrote that, in his opinion, there was no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties. In the past decades this claim has driven much empirical research and, by and large, the evidence supports Darwin’s hypothesis. One mental faculty, however, has been particularly difficult to study empirically, with little progress made until recently: the faculty of language. Non-human primates notoriously do not speak, and are unable to acquire speech even with substantial training efforts. Yet speech is only one manifestation of human language, a complex behaviour based on a number of fundamental processes: coding, inference, and assessments of common ground. In this talk I present our research programme on the biological origins of these processes in the different modalities of non-human primate communication and the underlying social cognition. Although primates have little control over their articulators, they are able to encode information using discrete and graded signals, sometimes composed into more complex sequences. The first line of investigation concerns the flexibility of primate signal production, both at the unit and sequence level, in the visual and vocal domain. The second line deals with the question of semantic content, that is, what types of meaning receivers can extract from signals and sequences, and how they integrate signal structure and sequential composition with pragmatic context and signaller intention. The third line of enquiry is to study the biological origins of common ground, including audience awareness and cooperative motivation during acts of communication. Primate social cognition and communication are intimately intertwined, so that the overall goal of our research programme is to empirically elucidate this crucial intersection to provide a deeper understanding of the primate origins of the human language faculty.
The superior levels of intelligence and cognitive abilities of elephants have been recognized since ancient times but only more recently are these being investigated within a scientific framework. In Asia the elephant, both in the wild and in captivity, has had a long history of interactions with people. The behavioural response of elephants to people can be thus expected to have been shaped by not only its intrinsic levels of intelligence but also by the nature of its past interactions. In this talk I shall first give some examples of the behaviour of wild Asian elephants, as observed in the field, before going on to link such behaviour to their adaptive responses to surviving in human-dominated landscapes. Elephants exhibit a range of behaviours in the wild from “grief” following death of a calf, to “cleverness” in sneak mating strategies, “aggression” against potential predators, and “tool use” in a variety of situations. When elephants enter human settlements, home gardens and agricultural fields in reach of food, water and even locally-brewed alcohol, they put their intelligent behavioural skills to good effect to achieve their goals. They sneak in silently into settlements and fields even when they have to cross a river, show controlled aggression against people who attempt to thwart their goals, and use their tusks or branches of trees as tools to break electric fences. Male elephants employ tactics from their social relationships in the wild such as all-male coalitions to tackle hostile farmers or attachment to an older male to learn the art of crop raiding. A comprehensive understanding of elephant psychology is necessary if we are to effectively manage the negative interactions between elephants and people.
Social animals face a problem. Competitors can monitor their behavior and learn to predict their actions. Theoretical models of signaling games predict that competing agents should select actions that minimize information broadcast to opponents. The degree to which animals plan to deceive others or merely adopt rule-based strategies that function deceptively remains hotly debated. Moreover, the neuronal mechanisms mediating deceptive tactics are unknown. To answer these questions, we developed a new competitive experimental paradigm designed to address the fundamental neurobiology of deceptive tactics in nonhuman primates. Here we show that pairs of rhesus macaques playing a computer soccer game develop dynamic, unpredictable, circuitous paths, which we refer to as feints. Using information theory, we show that these feints reduce the information monkeys provide to their opponent about their goal, thus serving to deceive him. Neuroimaging studies in humans have identified the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), among other areas, as potential components of a circuit for deceptive strategies. Analysis of both eye movements and firing rates of DLPFC neurons revealed that monkeys plan feints far in advance of their execution. A subset of DLPFC neurons selectively signaled deceptive plans but not other planned visually-guided movements. Pharmacological inactivation of DLPFC, but not DMPFC, impaired execution of deceptive tactics, leading to poor performance and an increased rate of losing the game. Together, these findings indicate that DLPFC is critical for strategic deception in competitive contexts, consistent with its role in planning and decision-making. These findings also show that nonhuman primates, like humans, plan deceptive tactics in advance rather than by merely reacting online to an opponent’s movements.
In my talk I will first describe research that illustrates the behavioral signatures of the approximate number system (ANS) in nonhuman primates. While there are significant individual differences in the Precision of the ANS there do not appear to be species differences at least within the primate order. I will then turn to the neural basis of the ANS. Prior work suggests that neurons in the ventral intraparietal area of the well-trained rhesus monkey provide a labeled line code for numerosity. In contrast neurons in the lateral intraparietal area of the numerically naive rhesus monkey hold a summation code for numerosity. I will describe new data from our research group that suggests that very few VIP neurons are selective to numerosity in the naive monkey, but that numerosity can be derived from the firing of the population of non-numerically selective VIP neurons.
My talk will consist of two parts. First I will discuss approaches to the study of emotion in animals, and the difficulties with such approaches. This will also include a discussion of the neural basis of emotions. The second part of my talk will then focus on a case example: the emotion fear, and the brain structure of the amygdala. For this second part I will compare studies in rodents and monkeys on the amygdala’s role in fear, with our own studies in humans. Overall, I will argue of the importance for neuroscience data in the study of animal psychology. Background paper: DJ Anderson & R Adolphs (2014), “A framework for studying emotions across species”,
In a rodent model for empathic helping established in my laboratory, a rat learns, without external reward or training, to deliberately open a door and thereby free a trapped rat. The motivational impetus for this pro-social behavior is neither motor mastery nor the potential reward of social play. Instead, our work suggests that communication of distress from the trapped rat to the free rat is required for helping. A rat that successfully releases a trapped rat experiences ending the trapped rat’s distress as internally rewarding, meaning that helping has consequences that are desirable and that the rat seeks to experience again by intentional actions. In experiments designed to explore how the social relationship between free and trapped rats influences helping, rats were tested with cagemates or strangers from familiar or unfamiliar stocks (commonly termed outbred strain). Rats consistently help strangers from familiar stocks but do not help strangers from unfamiliar stocks, demonstrating that helping requires strain familiarity but not individual familiarity. If experience is so effective in facilitating pro-sociality, is there any role for genetics or relatedness? To address this question, rats were transferred at birth to litters from a different stock. Fostered rats never saw or interacted with another rat of their own stock until testing, making their own stock unfamiliar. Remarkably, although rats helped strangers from the fostering stock that they were raised with, they did not help trapped strangers of their own stock. This experiment shows that rats are not born with the motivation to help their own kind but rather must acquire that motivation through social interactions. Flexibility in determining one’s pro-social in-group would be advantageous in changing social environments.
While the evolution of cooperative behaviors has generated an intense debate among evolutionists and animal behaviorists, the proximate mechanisms underlying cooperative relationships have received much less attention. In recent years, it has become clear that an understanding of proximate causation of cooperation is needed in order to obtain a more balanced and complete picture of the biology of the phenomenon. The proximate cause of cooperation refers to the immediate situation that triggers behavior, and the role of learning, memory, physiology, and neural processes. Since from an evolutionary point of view cooperative relationships are maintained because of the subsequent benefits they bring, there has been the tendency to erroneously assume that they are also motivated by their future benefits. This assumption would imply that animals engage in social interactions in order to gain future benefits, or that they are able to remember the services given by another individuals in order to offer a service in return at a later date. While this “rational” calculation offers a possible explanation, it is currently unclear whether or not some animal species have these cognitive capacities. Here I will argue that less-cognitively demanding mechanisms could be at the basis of the ?exibility needed to form complex, enduring cooperative relationships in animals in general, and in carnivores in particular. I will present work showing that coatis (Nasua nasua) direct agonistic support preferentially to those group members that support them most, and that this pattern could be mediated by simple emotional bookkeeping. I will also give examples of unconscious mimicry in domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) and wolves (Canis lupus lupus), a behavior known to facilitate affiliation and pro-social behaviors between interacting individuals. Finally, I will show that oxytocin, a hypothalamic neuropeptide that plays an important role in various reproductive effects in mammals, enhances in domestic dogs a suit of behaviors related with cooperative bond formation and maintenance. While complex cognitive mechanisms may be present in some species, these examples are in line with the idea that simpler mechanisms, based on emotions, may be at the core of the patterns of cooperation reported for humans and other animals.
We often do good to others without expecting any return when we see people in need, even if they are unrelated strangers. Such prosocial behaviors support our society. Prosocial behaviors are defined as “voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another individual or group of individuals” (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989) and has been considered a hallmark of humans in the past. However, recently, accumulating experimental data in comparative cognitive science have revealed that non-human animals also show prosocial behaviors. Why have prosocial behaviors evolved? From an ultimate perspective, the reason can be explained comparatively easily. Prosocial behaviors are beneficial to the actor when the recipient is related with the actor (kin selection; Hamilton, 1964) or when the recipient behaves prosocially toward the actor in return (reciprocal altruism; Trivers, 1971). A possible proximate mechanism has also been identified (e.g., de Waal & Suchak, 2010). Although a proximate as well as ultimate mechanism has been suggested to support evolution of prosocial behaviors, the psychological mechanism of prosocial behaviors remains unclear. Here, I introduce one potent psychological mechanism, put forward by Yamamoto and Takimoto (2012), that seems to support nonhuman primates’ prosocial behaviors. Prosocial behaviors must be driven by other-regarding motivations when an individual cannot predict any return benefit (e.g., de Waal, 2008). Yamamoto and Takimoto (2012) indicated that empathy, the ability to share the feelings and emotions of others, is the most plausible underlying psychological mechanism of prosocial behaviors and may also be important in promoting them. On the other hand, a sense of fairness may play a role as a stabilizer of prosocial behaviors in non-human primates. That is, prosocial behaviors can be maintained by a sense of fairness, the inhibitory system for unnecessarily excessive expression of them. Without a sense of fairness, empathic individuals might be exploited by free-riders, which might lead to the extinction of prosocial behaviors. Therefore, the interplay of empathy and a sense of fairness is considered to be important to maintaining prosocial behaviors. In this talk, first, I will introduce experimental studies on prosocial behaviors in nonhuman primates, and discuss any similarities and differences between them. Secondly, I will talk about the psychological mechanism of prosocial behaviors by mainly discussing the role of empathy and a sense of fairness in them. Thirdly, I will demonstrate, by focusing on the behavioral data from tufted capuchin monkeys, that evidence from nonhuman primates supports this psychological mechanism.
Retrieving stored information either from working memory or long-term memory is an essential component of planning abilities. In fact, some authors have argued that certain types of memory like episodic memory and mental time travel have evolved not just to recall information but to assist organisms to solve current that they face or future problems that they may encounter. Although there has been some research on both memory and planning skills in the great apes, there has not been a concerted effort to investigate them together. This information is crucial to make inferences about the evolution of memory and planning systems in humans and other animals. In this talk, I will focus on object use in the great apes in problem solving situations. More specifically, I will examine various aspects of long-term memories for single events including cued recall and the importance of the various cues during encoding and recall. Additionally, I will examine planning for future goals in two contexts: exchanging tokens for food and making tools. Although the bulk of the talk will be devoted to data on great apes I will also include data on monkeys and corvids to offer a broader perspective on the evolution of these abilities.
Prospective memory (PM) involves remembering to perform a planned action or intention at an appropriate future time. PM is highly prevalent in daily life and can range in importance from being rather trivial (remembering to add an attachment to an email) to critical (remembering to take medication). For this reason, PM has been studied extensively in humans. However, PM has been understudied in nonhuman animals. We have designed a variety of PM tasks for use with nonhuman primates (and human children). These non-verbal tasks sometimes mimic the designs used in research with adult humans, and in other cases make use of the special capacities or training histories of our chimpanzees and monkeys. I will provide an overview of these research projects.
With chimpanzees, we assessed PM using naturalistic tasks. Chimpanzees had to remember to request a hidden food item at a later time by naming it with a lexigram symbol. In all experiments, after seeing a food being hidden, the chimpanzees had to retain this memory for 3-30 minutes while participating in a concurrent task such as foraging for preferred food items or matching lexigram tokens to photos of representative food items. The chimpanzees had to request the hidden food at specific times during these tasks, and so they had to encode when to make those requests and then remember to do so at the appropriate time. In most variations, the chimpanzees succeeded in doing this, even when the appropriate moment for implementing the PM was determined by the experimenter or was left to the chimpanzee to decide. Thus, chimpanzees appear to have the capacity for PM in tasks that are similar in basic design and complexity to those used with humans.
In another series of experiments, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys were presented with a variation of the matching-to-sample task in which they had to anticipate and plan a future response before they were allowed to make it. After seeing only the sample, monkeys performed a psychomotor task in which they pursued moving stimuli around the screen. Later, they had to remember to make the matching response. Both species succeeded in this task, demonstrating that they anticipated future responses before they could be made. Thus, monkeys also appear to show some of the characteristic features of a PM system.
(Supported by National Institute of Child Health and Human Development grant HD060563 and National Science Foundation grant BCS-0924811.)
In our daily lives, we make plans to do things at particular times in the future. Neuropsychological and neuroimaing studies have been focusing on memory of such plans or intentions, which is called prospective memory (PM). The broadly accepted divisions involved in PM consist of prospective memory component (PMC), the process for remembering to remember, and retrospective memory component, the process for remembering the content of intended actions. Although both components need to be appropriately processed for realizing intentions, PMC is particularly essential since it requires spontaneous memory retrieval. In this talk, I will first present our neuropsychological and neuroimaging investigations for identifying unique characteristics of future cognition in humans. As a neuropsychological study, I will highlight the question of whether damage to part of the prefrontal cortex affects attenuated performance of PMC. Our data indicated that the following three areas are highly contributory to PMC performance: the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex; and the left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These areas are all located in the anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10), which has been considered as the most critical area for prospective remembering. I will then provide our results from functional MRI study to demonstrate the effectiveness of implicit cues for making awareness of sustaining intentions in mind. The results also support the involvement of the anterior prefrontal cortex (BA10). Recent cognitive neuroscience studies have been focusing on the role of the BA10 from the perspectives of default-mode network and episodic future thinking. In the final part of my talk, I will address some questions for uncovering the function of the BA10 from integrative perspectives for understanding the unique properties of future cognition in humans.
From Meitetsu-Nagoya Station
About 25 minutes by the Rapid Limited Express (Kaisoku Tokkyu) or Limited Express (Tokkyu).
From Central Japan International Airport Station
About 55 minutes by μSKY Limited Express (Myu Sukai)
Map and Transportation Guide
@ INUYAMA Tourists Information Center Website
We will not arrange accommodation for participants. Please make sure to secure a room at your preferred hotel by yourself. Information about the hotels near the venue is listed below. You can also contact the Inuyama Tourists Information Center for more information (http://inuyama.gr.jp/, TEL: 0568-61-6000).
宿泊施設の斡旋はいたしません。宿泊予約はご自身でお願いします。会場近隣のホテルの情報につきましては，下記ならびに犬山観光案内所 http://inuyama.gr.jp/（Tel: 0568-61-6000） をご参照下さい。
問い合わせ……犬山シティホテル TEL 0568-61-1600
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|Undergraduate Student (as First Author)||¥ 1,000||-|